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CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE SUPREME COURT:   
THE ARTICLE V PROBLEM 
Eric J. Segall* 
How the Supreme Court has interpreted and given meaning to 
the United States Constitution, and thus created constitutional law, 
has changed dramatically over time.  Major doctrinal shifts have oc-
curred without any change in constitutional text or newly discovered 
historical evidence about what the Constitution originally meant.  To 
give just a few of many examples, how Congress may regulate com-
merce,1 what kind of aid the government may give to religious 
schools,2 what right, if any, a woman has to terminate her pregnancy,3 
what the Second Amendment means,4 and what level of protection 
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 1 Compare Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22, 32–33 (2005) (holding that the Commerce 
Clause allows Congress to regulate purely local activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce), with United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608, 613 (2000) (holding that 
the Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to regulate noneconomic activities with 
indirect economic effects, because the distinction between “what is national and what is 
local” would be obliterated (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995))), 
and Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (holding that the Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to 
regulate non-commercial activities). 
 2 Compare Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652–53 (2002) (holding that a govern-
ment program that gave neutral aid with respect to religion and gave assistance to citi-
zens, who then privately chose to fund religious schools, did not violate the Establishment 
Clause), with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248–51 (1977) (holding that giving instruc-
tional materials other than textbooks to students attending religious schools violated the 
Establishment Clause). 
 3 Compare Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156, 161–64 (2007) (holding that a partial-
birth abortion ban was constitutional even without an exception for the health of the 
mother), with Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (recog-
nizing “the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to ob-
tain it without undue interference from the State,” but confirming a state’s right to re-
strict abortions after viability), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 163 (1973) (holding 
that a woman has a fundamental right to privacy that enables her to choose to terminate 
her pregnancy during the first trimester). 
 4 Compare McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (holding that the Due 
Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment right for an individual to keep and 
bear arms against state laws), and District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) 
(holding that the Second Amendment protects individuals’ right to possess a firearm and 
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courts should give to commercial speech,5 are all issues the Court has 
answered differently at various times in our history.  How to account 
for these constitutional changes is an issue that has vexed scholars 
and judges for generations.  After all, as Judge Posner has observed, 
“[i]f changing judges changes law, it is not even clear what law is.”6 
My contribution to this fine symposium on constitutional inter-
pretation addresses one small component of the large and complex 
question surrounding constitutional change.  This Article concerns 
the interplay between judicial review and Article V of the Constitu-
tion, which sets out the procedures for formally amending the Con-
stitution.7  According to the text, the Constitution can only be 
amended if two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and three-fourths 
of the states agree or two-thirds of the states call for a convention.8  
This Article addresses when, if ever, judicial interpretations of the 
Constitution amount to illegitimate and de facto amendments to the 
Constitution because they were not implemented through Article V 
procedures. 
Although I believe our country would be better off with a strongly 
deferential system of judicial review where courts only overturn deci-
sions of other political actors if those decisions are at an “irreconcila-
ble variance” with clear constitutional text,9 we do not live in that 
 
to use that firearm for lawful self-defense in their homes), with United States v. Miller, 307 
U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or 
use of a [firearm] . . . at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or 
efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guaran-
tees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”). 
 5 Compare 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (holding that 
commercial speech that is misleading or deceptive can be regulated and “therefore justi-
fies less than strict review,” but regulation of truthful speech gives “far less reason to de-
part from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands”), and 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (holding that commercial 
speech is afforded “a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate 
position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that 
might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression”), with Bates v. State 
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendment 
protects the truthful advertising of “routine” legal services).  Compare Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (holding that 
the First Amendment protects speech that does “no more than propose a commercial 
transaction” (citation omitted)), with Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1942) 
(holding that the First Amendment was not violated when the defendant was prohibited 
from distributing business advertising material in the public street). 
 6 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 1 (2008). 
 7 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 8 Id. 
 9 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 578 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1885); see 
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. 
L. REV. 129, 138–39 (1893) (examining Alexander Hamilton’s descriptions of the federal 
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world.  Rather, as David Strauss among others has explained,10 consti-
tutional law has developed much like the common law, with Court 
decisions building on and often reversing prior decisions, and the 
Court has generally not been deferential to other political decision-
makers in numerous areas of constitutional law.  My thesis about 
when Court decisions amount to de facto amendments to the Consti-
tution accepts this strong system of judicial review as a fait accompli. 
In this system, the Court does not improperly contravene Article V 
when it changes its interpretations of vague constitutional words and 
phrases such as “due process,” “equal protection,” “unreasonable 
searches and seizures,” “speech,” “establishment,” and “free exercise.”  
The shifts back and forth in these areas of law may simply reflect rea-
sonable disagreements over ambiguous text and contested history 
and amount to nothing more than the Court doing the best it can to 
interpret our foundational document.  Although the meaning and 
application of the Constitution to hard cases changes regularly be-
cause the changing Justices cause shifts in judicial doctrine, the cur-
rent system anticipates these changes without the need to formally 
adhere to Article V. 
When the Court ignores or distorts clear and unambiguous consti-
tutional text, however, absent such an interpretation leading to an 
absurd result, the Court is, in effect, amending the Constitution 
without utilizing Article V procedures.  For example, the Constitution 
requires that the President be thirty-five years old, and if the Court 
were to sanction a thirty-three-year-old President, then it would effec-
tively and improperly amend the Constitution.  Our system of judicial 
review assumes that judges will take text at least partly seriously; oth-
erwise the Constitution would have little binding force.   
The next Part of this Article contends that the Court has improp-
erly amended the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments without going 
through the required Article V procedures.  These sections do not 
purport to exhaustively review the literature or arguments surround-
ing the Court’s interpretations of the Tenth and Eleventh Amend-
ments, but rather simply demonstrate how my thesis about proper 
constitutional change can be used to helpfully analyze Court deci-
sions. 
 
Constitution in the FEDERALIST NO. 78); see generally, e.g., ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS:  
WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES 176–83 
(2012). 
 10 E.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 
(1996). 
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I.  THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
The Eleventh Amendment is one of the clearest provisions in the 
United States Constitution.  It provides that “[t]he Judicial power of 
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law 
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”11  The Amendment quite obviously bars any suit, whether for 
damages or an injunction, against a state by citizens of “another” 
state. 
In Hans v. Louisiana, decided in 1890, a citizen of Louisiana sued 
Louisiana for unpaid interest on state bonds.12  His lawyer made the 
obvious argument, based on clear text, that the Eleventh Amendment 
could not bar the suit because a citizen of Louisiana was suing his 
own state, not “another” state.13  The Court rejected this argument, 
prohibited the suit, and in effect amended the Constitution without 
Congress or the states using the procedures set forth in Article V.  
The gist of the Court’s rationale was the following: 
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was 
understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in 
the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of 
foreign states, was indignantly repelled?  Suppose that Congress, when 
proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that 
nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being sued by its 
own citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United 
States:  can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the States?  
The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its face.14 
In fact, there is nothing absurd about states being amenable to 
suits by their own citizens, but not citizens of other states.  It is one 
thing for the citizens of a state to raid their own treasury, but quite 
another to allow citizens from other states to do so.  Moreover, histo-
rians agree that the Eleventh Amendment was enacted specifically to 
reverse the 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia,15 where the Court allowed 
a citizen of South Carolina to sue Georgia, the precise situation 
barred by the text of the Eleventh Amendment.  There is nothing in 
the text or history of the Eleventh Amendment to suggest it would 
apply to citizens suing their own states. 
 
 11 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added). 
 12 134 U.S. 1, 1 (1890). 
 13 Id. at 10. 
 14 Id. at 15. 
 15 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 419 (1793). 
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The modern Court has agreed that the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar suits by citizens against their own states.  
The conservative Justices have instead argued that “we have under-
stood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, 
but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.”16  Justice David H. 
Souter has persuasively rebutted this argument by noting that “plain 
text is the Man of Steel in a confrontation,” with background princi-
ples and presuppositions.17  Unfortunately, Justice Souter’s interpre-
tation of the Amendment is just as counter-textual as the interpreta-
tion of the conservatives he is criticizing, as he would allow federal 
question suits against a state brought by citizens of another state.  To 
the best of my knowledge, no Supreme Court Justice has ever advo-
cated that the Eleventh Amendment be interpreted as it is written, 
although it would make sense to do so.  Such a reading might not be 
the best or most desirable policy result, but it is the only one dictated 
by clear text.  This straying from unambiguous constitutional com-
mands demonstrates how far the Court will go to ignore prior positive 
law to achieve desired policy goals, even if it means effectively amend-
ing the Constitution to do so. 
II.  THE TENTH AMENDMENT 
The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”18  
Along with the Supremacy Clause in Article VI,19 the balance between 
federal and state power could not be clearer:  Congress only has 
those powers enumerated in the Constitution (all other powers are 
reserved to the states or the people), but when Congress validly exer-
cises its powers, federal law trumps state law.  The Tenth Amendment 
and the Supremacy Clause do not tell us when Congress is properly 
exercising its enumerated powers, but when Congress does so, state 
law must give way. 
In New York v. United States,20 the Court effectively amended the 
Constitution by creating a non-textual exception to the constitution-
ally required federalism structure outlined above.  The issue in New 
 
 16 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (citing Blatchford v. Native Vil-
lage of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)). 
 17 Id. at 116 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 19 Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
 20 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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York was whether Congress could require the states to either clean up 
low-level radioactive waste or assume responsibility for any damages 
caused by the waste.21  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s majority opin-
ion specifically conceded that the “[r]egulation of the . . . interstate 
market in waste disposal is . . . well within Congress’ authority under 
the Commerce Clause.”22  Justice O’Connor also said, “The States un-
questionably do retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authori-
ty . . . to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of 
their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Gov-
ernment.”23  Because the Court in New York conceded that Congress 
has the power to regulate low-level radioactive waste, and because do-
ing so does not violate any other provision of the Constitution, New 
York’s challenge to Congress’s authority should have been rejected. 
Instead of following the clear text and structure of the Constitu-
tion, however, the Court made up a new rule of constitutional law 
(which it conceded did not derive from the text of the Tenth 
Amendment),24 that Congress is not allowed to direct the states to 
take certain actions, unless it does so through a generally applicable 
law.  This anti-commandeering principle (as it has come to be called) 
cannot be found anywhere in the text of the Constitution.  It is also 
inconsistent with the idea that congressionally created federal law is 
supreme, if it is authorized by an enumerated power and does not vi-
olate specific constitutional limitations on that power.  As Justice 
John Paul Stevens said in dissent, 
 
 21 Id. at 149, 152–53.  In 1979, only three sites were open to properly dispose of low-level 
radioactive waste; two were forced to shut down that year because they reached maximum 
capacity.  Id. at 150.  The United States was faced with the possibility of not having any 
disposal sites for low-level radioactive waste.  Id.  In 1985, Congress enacted the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Act, which provided a compromise for states with and without 
sites.  Id. at 151.  The Act would allow unsited states to use the facilities of sited states for 
seven years, if the unsited states agreed to end their external reliance by 1992.  Id.  The 
Act provided three incentives for a sited state to provide proper disposal of the waste 
generated inside and outside their borders.  Id. at 152.  First, a state could impose a sur-
charge on waste collected from other states; the surcharges would be given to the gov-
ernment to redistribute to cooperating states.  Id.  Second, states could raise those sur-
charges to non-complying states and eventually deny them access altogether.  Id. at 153.  
Third, states that did not set up their own disposal sites before a mandatory deadline 
would either have to take title to their waste or be liable for all damages caused by the 
waste.  Id. at 153–54.  New York, “a State whose residents generate a relatively large share 
of the Nation’s low level radioactive waste . . . complied with the Act’s requirements,” 
then ceased to comply and sued the government, arguing the Act was inconsistent with 
the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments.  Id. at 154. 
 22 Id. at 160. 
 23 Id. at 156 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Garcia v. San An-
tonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985)). 
 24 New York, 505 U.S. at 156. 
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The notion that Congress does not have the power to issue a simple 
command to state governments to implement legislation enacted by 
Congress, is incorrect and unsound.  There is no such limitation in the 
Constitution.  The Tenth Amendment surely does not impose any limit 
on Congress’ exercise of the powers delegated to it by Article I.  Nor does 
the structure of the constitutional order or the values of federalism man-
date such a formal rule.  To the contrary, the Federal Government di-
rects state governments in many realms.  The Government regulates 
state-operated railroads, state school systems, state prisons, state elec-
tions, and a host of other state functions.  Similarly, there can be no 
doubt that, in time of war, Congress could either draft soldiers itself or 
command the States to supply their quotas of troops.  I see no reason why 
Congress may not also command the States to enforce federal water and 
air quality standards or federal standards for the disposition of low-level 
radioactive wastes.25 
The unexpected rule the Court devised in New York, that Congress 
is not allowed to require state legislatures to help implement federal 
law, as Justice Stevens noted, is nowhere in the text of the Constitu-
tion and was not supported by any history cited in Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion.  The next time the Court returned to this issue was in Printz 
v. United States.26  The issue was whether the federal government could 
require state law enforcement officers to provide background checks 
on gun purchasers prior to the creation of a national database.27 
This time, the parties fully briefed the issue of whether Congress 
could commandeer state governments (here, state executive officers) 
to help implement federal law.28  Once again, the five conservatives 
held the answer was “no,” despite clear historical evidence to the con-
trary.29  As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers, “[T]he 
legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will 
be incorporated into the operations of the national government as far 
as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered auxilia-
ry to the enforcement of its laws.”30 
As Justice Stevens pointed out, “It is hard to imagine a more une-
quivocal statement that state judicial and executive branch officials 
may be required to implement federal law where the National Gov-
 
 25 Id. at 211 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 26 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot compel States to enact or en-
force a federal regulatory program by directly conscripting states’ officers). 
 27 Id. at 902. 
 28 See Brief for Petitioner at i, Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (No. 95-1478); Brief for United States at i, 
Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (No. 95-1478). 
 29 Id. at 935. 
 30 THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 223 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1885) (se-
cond emphasis added). 
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ernment acts within the scope of its affirmative powers.”31  In direct 
contradiction to the clear text of the Tenth Amendment, and the 
best historical evidence available, the Supreme Court has decided for 
its own policy purposes that Congress is not allowed to commandeer 
state legislatures and state executives (for a bizarre and never ade-
quately explained reason, state courts fall outside this rule) when it 
exercises its enumerated powers. 
Conservative Justices have long argued that the structure of the 
Constitution requires the rejection of a rule that would effectively al-
low the federal government to destroy state sovereignty. 32  Requiring 
states to help implement valid federal laws (passed pursuant to an 
enumerated power), however, does no such thing.  Moreover, the an-
ti-commandeering principle allows the Court to overturn the exercise 
of concededly valid congressional exercises of enumerated powers 
based solely on the Justices’ idiosyncratic and shifting ideas of appro-
priate federalism values.  That is not the scheme that the Constitution 
sets forth in the Tenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause.  If 
the Justices are concerned that the exercise of an enumerated power 
(such as the Commerce Clause) violates important state sovereignty 
values, the Court should interpret the enumerated power differently 
to give Congress less power, not concoct a non-textual limitation on 
federal power found nowhere in the Constitution and inapposite to 
the clear text.  In other words, structural concerns certainly can help 
inform interpretation, but they should not give birth to judicially 
constructed rules that effectively amend the balance of power set 
forth in the Constitution. 
This criticism of New York and Printz does not rest solely on seman-
tic concerns (because the same result could arguably be reached by 
narrowing the interpretation of the Commerce Clause).  Where text 
is truly ambiguous, judges in a system of strong judicial review have 
no choice but to turn to background and structural principles to ap-
ply that vague norm to difficult problems.  But, where text is clear 
 
 31 Printz, 521 U.S. at 947–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 32 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (holding that 
the Commerce Clause did not grant Congress the authority to enact the Gun Free School 
Zone Act, because it “forecloses the States from experimenting and exercising their own 
judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of history and expertise, and it does 
so by regulating an activity beyond the realm of commerce in the ordinary and usual 
sense of that term”); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (holding 
that the Commerce Clause did not grant Congress the power to apply the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to state governments because it would “impair the States’ ‘ability to func-
tion effectively in a federal system’”), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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and there is one meaning that is more persuasive than the rest, giving 
Justices carte blanche to change that meaning to suit their policy 
preferences gives them, in effect, the power to amend the document.  
That is not the system of constitutional change embodied in the text 
of the Constitution. 
The decisions in New York and Printz may or may not be good poli-
cy, but they are inconsistent with the Constitution as written and, 
therefore, amount to de facto amendments to that document without 
using the procedures set forth in Article V.  The rules the plaintiffs 
wanted in these cases do not represent good faith disagreement with 
ambiguous text and contested history, but rather, complete rejection 
of what the Framers of the Constitution wrote and thought.  The Su-
preme Court should not have embraced those rules because they 
represent illegitimate constitutional change. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has gone back and forth over the years on 
many issues involving vague constitutional text and contested history.  
These flip-flops on questions like abortion, gun rights, affirmative ac-
tion, speech, and religion may or may not represent the most persua-
sive interpretations of the Constitution (if such a thing exists), but 
there is nothing inherently illegitimate about differing constructions 
of ambiguous constitutional language and unclear historical under-
standings.  Where, however, the text is perfectly clear, and undenia-
ble history does not undermine that clarity, the Supreme Court effec-
tively amends the Constitution when it ignores or distorts such text to 
achieve its own policy objectives.  That is exactly what has happened 
with the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments.  The judicial interpreta-
tions of those provisions demonstrate that the Court has, from time 
to time, amended the United States Constitution without implement-
ing the procedures required by Article V. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
